GIFT is a family of lightweight block ciphers presented at CHES 2017. Biclique cryptanalysis is proposed to attack the full AES by Bogdanov et al. in ASIACRYPT 2011. The attack can decrease computation complexity using the technology of meet-in-the-middle and reduce data complexity utilising the biclique structure. In this paper, we first provide an unbalanced biclique attack on full round GIFT. The master key has been recovered for the full round GIFT-64 by a 5-round 4 × 16 unbalanced biclique with data complexity of 2 16 and time complexity of 2 122.95 . Furthermore, a 4-round 8 × 24 unbalanced biclique is constructed on GIFT-128 to recover the master key with data complexity of 2 80 and computational complexity of 2 118.38 , respectively. The research results show GIFT algorithm has weak immunity to biclique cryptanalysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
The widespread analysis methods include differential cryptanalysis [1] , [2] , linear cryptanalysis, meet-in-the-middle (MITM) [3] , division cryptanalysis [4] and biclique attack [5] , [6] . Biclique cryptanalysis is a typical key-recovery attack that is proposed to attack the full AES by Bogdanov et al. in ASIACRYPT 2011 [7] . The attack can decrease computation and data complexity by using the main idea of MITM attack and the basic principle of the biclique structure, where the MITM attack is a typical method in the cryptanalysis of block ciphers and has been improved by many techniques [8] , including splice-and-cut and so on. The researchers provided two biclique methods for AES, that is, the long and the independent related-key differentials bicliques.
The biclique attack is a variant of the MITM of cryptanalysis and achieves good results in the analysis of SHA hash function family [9] . The biclique attack can decrease computation complexity using the technology of meet-inthe-middle and reduce data complexity utilising the biclique structure. The biclique attack will be used widely in the The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Honglong Chen . security analyses of many block ciphers such as Midori [10] , Skinny [11] , TWINE [12] , PRESENT [13] , [14] , Piccolo [15] , [16] , HIGHT [17] , [19] , IDEA [18] and KLEIN [20] .
A favorable hardware efficiency has become a major design trend in cryptography given the increasing importance of ubiquitous computing. Many lightweight algorithms have been proposed recently, especially the block cipher GIFT [21] , [22] . GIFT is a family of lightweight block ciphers presented by Banik et al. at CHES 2017. The designers adopted an substitution permutation network(SPN) structure which is similar to PRESENT [23] . Two versions of GIFT are used with 64 and 128-bit state sizes, and the round numbers are 28 and 40 respectively. However, GIFT has been attacked by several cryptographers with different cryptanalysis methods. In 2018, Zhao et al. provided a differential cryptanalysis over a 16-round GIFT-64 [1] , with 2 62 chosen plaintexts and 2 83 computational complexity. Zhu et al. showed another differential cryptanalysis over a 19-round GIFT-64 [2] , with data complexity of 2 62.4 and time complexity of 2 111.4 , and a 25-round GIFT-128 with with data complexity of 2 125 and time complexity of 2 125 .
In this paper, we focus on the biclique cryptanalysis of GIFT block cipher. The crucial point of the biclique attack is VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ building a biclique structure at the ciphertext (or plaintext), thereby connecting 2 d 1 ciphertexts (or plaintexts) and 2 d 2 intermediate states.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
We study the characteristics of the algorithm structure deeply and the diffusion properties of key schedule. We provide an unbalanced biclique attack on full GIFT for the first several rounds. The research results show GIFT algorithm has weak immunity to biclique cryptanalysis.
(1) We present a 5-round 4×16 unbalanced biclique to key recovery of full round GIFT-64, with data and computational complexities of 2 16 and 2 122.88 , respectively.
(2) A 4-round 8 × 24 unbalanced biclique structure on GIFT-128 is provided, with data and computational complexities of 2 80 and 2 118.38 , correspondingly.
The comparisons between our scheme and other methods are summarised in Table 1 .
B. ORGANIZATION
This paper is organized as follows. Research and development on algorithm GIFT is summarized in Section I. The notations used throughout this paper and a brief description of GIFT-64/128 are introduced in Section II. The principle of biclique attack is briefly discussed and the key recovery attacks on full round GIFT-64 by unbalanced bicliques is also provided in Section III. Then, the biclique attack on full round GIFT-128 and the data and computational complexities are presented in Section IV. Finally, we draw our conclusions and summarize this paper in Section V. : concatenation. F r i : the i-th cell(4 bits) of the state after AddRoundKey of the r-th round function.
II. DESCRIPTION OF GIFT
F r i,j : the i-th and j-th cells of F r . a (b) : b denoting the bit length of a.
B. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF GIFT
GIFT is a lightweight block cipher of the SPN structure. There are two versions, GIFT-64 and GIFT-128, where the sizes of state are 64 and 128 bits, and the numbers of round are 28 and 40, respectively. The key sizes of both versions are the same 128 bits. The overall structure of GIFT-64 is illustrated in Figure 1 , and the number of S-boxes for GIFT-128 is 32.
1) ROUND FUNCTION
The round function of GIFT is composed of the following 3 steps.
(1) SubCell: the same S-box(4 × 4) is applied parallelly to each nibble S i , 0 ≤ i ≤ 15 for GIFT-64, 0 ≤ i ≤ 31 for GIFT-128, respectively.(Seen in Table 2) (2) PermBits: The bit permutation of GIFT-64 and GIFT-128 are shown in Table 3 and Table 4 , respectively.
(3) AddRoundKey: The round key RK is extracted from the master key K . A round key is first extracted from the master key K before the master key state updates. The 128bit master key of GIFT is represented as follows. K =
For GIFT-64, 32-bit of the key state are extracted from the master key K as the round key:
For GIFT-128, 64-bit of the key state are extracted from the master key K as the round key: 
2) THE KEY SCHEDULE
The key state for GIFT-64 and GIFT-128 are updated as follows:
III. BICLIQUE ATTACK ON GIFT-64 A. DEFINITION OF BICLIQUE
Biclique cryptanalysis is divided into 2 steps: constructing biclique structure and the MITM attack. The biclique structure determines the data complexity of the whole attack and the MITM attack reduces the computation complexity. The detailed steps of the attack and the basic principle of the biclique attack are presented in [7] .
The biclique structure links 2 d 1 plaintexts {P i } to 2 d 2 intermediate states {S j }. The core idea is to search two as possible as long differential paths which share no active state cells. The biclique structure can be considered as a subcipher, namely f ,
The 128 bites K is divided into 2 108 groups, and each group key consists of a 2 4 × 2 16 matrix:
be 0 (20) and enumerate the rest of 108 bits (K [0, 0] (16) , A (16) , A (16) , A (16) , A (10) 0 (2) A (4) , A (14) 0 (2) , 0 (8) A (8) , 0 (8) A (8) ] (16) , 0 (16) , 0 (16) , 0 (16) , 0 (16) , 0 (16) , A (8) 0 (8) , A (8) 0 (8) ] (16) , 0 (16) , 0 (16) , 0 (16) , 0 (10) A (2) 0 (4) , 0 (14) A (2) , 0 (16) , 0 (16) ]
We can construct a five-round 4 × 16 unbalanced biclique stucture on GIFT-64 ( Figure 2 ) utilizing the above key grouping scheme. The biclique stucture links 2 4 plaintexts to 2 16 intermediate states in each group key. The steps of constructing the biclique stucture are as follows:
Step 1. In Figure 2 (a), let P 0 = 0 (64) and encrypts P 0 for five rounds to obtain S 0 , i.e., S 0 = f K [0,0] (P 0 ). This process is called basic operations.
Step 2. The attacker encrypts P 0 with different keys K [i,0] for i ∈ {0, 1} 16 to obtain the corresponding intermediate states S i (Figure 2(b) ). The differences between K [0,0] and K [i,0] lead to the computation complexity. The diagonal stripes cells should be computed 2 2 -1 times and the blue cells should be computed 2 4 -1 times. The white cells must not be computed because this process shares the basic operations in Step 1. In this step, the attacker obtains f Step 3. The attacker decrypts S 0 with different keys K [0,j] for j ∈ {0, 1} 4 (Figure 2 (c)) to obtain the corresponding plaintexts P j . The differences between K [0,0] and K [0,j] bring the differences in certain cells. The diagonal stripes cells should be computed 2 2 -1 times and the white cells have been computed in Step 1. Thus, the attacker obtains f −1 (S 0 ) K [0,j] − − → P j . These two differential paths have no intersection in the first five rounds. Then, it is easy to verify that f (P j ) K [i,j] − → S i is always holds for all i ∈ {0, 1} 16 and j ∈ {0, 1} 4 as shown in Figure 2 . So, we can obtain a five-round 4 × 16 unbalanced biclique structure for each key group.
3) PHASE 3. MATCHING OVER 23 ROUNDS
In order to decrease computation complexity, V = F 9 12,8,4,0 , an 16-bit output of 9-th round, is selected as the internal matching variable (Figure 3 ) in two directions to attain the correct key.
4) FORWARD DIRECTION
We encrypt S i under the key K [i,0] to attain S i
Then, we encrypt S i by using all the possible 2 4 − 1 keys K [i,j] to attain S i
The differences between K [i,0] and K [i,j] lead to computation complexities. In Figure 3 (left part), the white cells are not active and must not be calculated. The vertical stripes cells should be computed 2 1 times and the diagonal stripes cells should be computed 2 2 times. The red cells should be computed 2 4 times and the yellow cells are computed once.
5) BACKWARD DIRECTION
Firstly, we encrypt the plaintexts P j for j ∈ {0, 1} 4 to attain 2 4 ciphertexts C j and decrypt C j under the key K [0,j] to attain C j
Then, we decrypt C j with all the possible 2 16 -1 keys K [i,j] to obtain C j
The differences between K [i,j] and K [0,j] lead to computation complexities. In Figure 3 (right part), the white cells must not be computed and the vertical stripes cells should be computed 2 1 times. The blue cells should be computed 2 4 times and the yellow cells are computed once.
6) SEARCH CANDIDATES
In the last process, we verify 2 20 keys utilizing the 16-bit matching variable of − → V i,j and ← − V i,j for all i ∈ {0, 1} 16 and j ∈ {0, 1} 4 . Then, the number of the remaining candidate key is 2 4 on average in each key group. We exhaustively check the remaining 2 108 candidate key until the correct key is found.
C. COMPLEXITIES OF FIVE-ROUND UNBALANCED BICLIQUE CRYPTANALYSIS ON GIFT-64 1) DATA COMPLEXITY
In Figure 2 (c), for each unbalanced biclique structure, we decrypt S 0 with the keys K [0,j] to obtain P j . All the plaintexts have differences only in four cells(S3, S2, S1 and S0). Thus, the data complexity does not exceed 2 16 .
2) COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
The computation complexity of the attack depends mainly on the number of the SubCell. Each round of GIFT-64 is composed of 16 SubCells and single encryption includes 28 × 16 = 448 SubCells. For each key of the 2 108 groups, the specific computation is as follows.
3) BICLIQUE COMPLEXITY
The 24 SubCells (Figure 2(b) , noted with diagonal stripes) need to compute 2 2 times and 24 SubCells (Figure 2(b) , noted with blue) need to compute 2 4 times. In Figure 2 (c), 6 Sub-Cells (noted with diagonal stripes) need to compute 2 2 times. The rest of 26 SubCells are computed once. Then the summation is 2 4 × 24 + 2 2 × 30 + 26 SubCells computations. Thus, the computation complexity of a biclique structure is approximately 2 0.24 full round GIFT-64 encryptions. 
4) MATCHING COMPLEXITY
In the forward direction (Figure 3 , left) of a single S i , 4 Sub-Cells (noted with red) need to compute 2 4 times, and 24 Sub-Cells (noted with diagonal stripes) need to compute 2 2 times. 4 SubCells (noted with vertical stripes) need to compute 2 1 times, and 36 SubCells (noted with yellow) are computed only once. 12 SubCells (noted with white) must not be computed. Thus, the complexity of this process is 2 16 × (2 4 × 4 + 2 2 × 24 + 2 1 × 4 + 48) SubCells, which is approximately 2 14 .94 full round GIFT-64 encryptions.
In the backward direction (Figure 3 , right) of a single C j , 212 SubCells (noted with blue) need to compute 2 4 times, and 16 SubCells (noted with vertical stripes) need to compute 2 1 times. 48 SubCells (noted with yellow) are computed only once and 12 SubCells (noted with white) must not be computed. Thus, the complexity of this process is 2 4 × (2 4 × 212 + 2 1 × 16 + 36) SubCells, which is approximately 2 6.95 full round GIFT-64 encryptions.
Finally, 2 20 key candidates are verified by a matching variable (16-bit) in each group, and the average of 2 20−16 = 2 4 candidate key should be rechecked.
Thus, the total computational complexity of the unbalanced biclique attack on GIFT-64 is:
× (2 0.24 + 2 14.94 + 2 6.95 + 2 4 ) ≈ 2 122.95 (3)
5) MEMORY COMPLEXITY
We need to store 2 4 × 16 bits (the backward direction) for the attack. [8, 6, 4, 2] and K 7 [15, 14, 13, 12, 7, 6, 5, 4 ] K 6 [7, 6, 5, 4 ] K 3 [15, 14, 13, 12, 7, 6, 5, 4 ] K 2 [15, 14, 13, 12] . The master key K is grouped as follows: (8) , 0 (4) A (4) 0 (4) A (4) , 0 (4) A (12) , A (7) (4) 0 (4) A (4) 0 (4) , 0 (8) A (4) 0 (4) , 0 (16) , 0 (16) , A (4) 0 (4) A (4) 0 (4) , A (4) 0 (12) , 0 (16) , 0 (16) ] K [0,j] = K [0,0] ⊕ [0 (16) , 0 (16) , 0 (16) , 0 (16) , 0 (7) ||A (1) ||0 (8) , 0 (6) ||A (1) ||0 (7) ||A (2) , 0 (16) , 0 (16) ]
IV. BICLIQUE ATTACK ON GIFT-128
where A (1) ∈ {0, 1}. 
2) PHASE 2. FOUR-ROUND 8 × 24 UNBALANCED BICLIQUE
We create a four-round 8 × 24 unbalanced biclique stucture on GIFT-128 ( Figure 4 ) utilizing the above key grouping scheme. The biclique stucture links 2 8 plaintexts to 2 24 intermediate states in each group key. The steps of constructing the biclique stucture are as follows:
Step 1. The basic operation is similar to that in Section III.B.
Step 2. The attacker encrypts P 0 under different keys K [i,0] for i ∈ {0, 1} 24 to obtain the corresponding intermediate states S i (Figure 4, left) . The differences between K [0,0] and K [i,0] lead to the computation complexity. The vertical stripes cells need to compute 2 1 -1 times, and the diagonal stripes cells need to compute 2 2 -1 times. The blue cells need to compute 2 4 -1 times, and the white cells must not be computed because this process shares the basic operations in Step 1. In this step, the attacker obtains f (P 0 ) K [i,0] − − → S i . Step 3. The attacker decrypts S 0 under different keys K [0,j] for j ∈ {0, 1} 8 (Figure 4 , right) to obtain the corresponding plaintexts P j . The differences between K [0,0] and K [0,j] bring the differences in certain cells. The vertical stripes cells need to compute 2 1 -1 times, and the diagonal stripes cells need to compute 2 2 -1 times. The red cells need to compute 2 4 -1 times, and the white cells must not be computed because this process shares the basic operations in Step 1. Thus, the attacker obtains f −1 (S 0 ) K [0,j] − − → P j . These two differential paths have no intersection in the first four rounds. Then, it is easy to verify that f (P j ) K [i,j] − → S i always holds for all i ∈ {0, 1} 24 and j ∈ {0, 1} 8 as shown in Figure 4 . So, we can obtain a four-round 8 × 24 unbalanced biclique structure for each key group. 
4) FORWARD DIRECTION
Then, we encrypt S i by using all the possible 2 8 − 1 keys K [i,j] to attain S i
The differences between K [i,0] and K [i,j] lead to computation complexities. In Figure 5 (left), the white cells are not active and must not be calculated. The vertical stripes cells should be computed 2 1 times, and the diagonal stripes cells should be computed 2 2 times. The diagonal crosshatch cells should be computed 2 3 times, and the red cells should be computed 2 4 times. The yellow cells are computed once.
5) BACKWARD DIRECTION
Firstly, we encrypt the plaintexts P j for j ∈ {0, 1} 8 to attain 2 8 ciphertexts C j and decrypt C j under the key K [0,j] to attain C j
Then, we decrypt C j with all the possible 2 24 -
The differences between K [i,j] and K [0,j] lead to computation complexities. In Figure 5 (right) , the white cells are not active and must not be calculated. The vertical stripes cells should be computed 2 1 times, and the diagonal stripes cells should be computed 2 2 times. The diagonal crosshatch cells should be computed 2 3 times, and the red cells should be computed 2 4 times. The yellow cells are computed once.
6) SEARCH CANDIDATES
In the last process, we verify 2 32 keys utilizing the 32-bit matching variable of − → V i,j and blue ← − V i,j for all i ∈ {0, 1} 24 and j ∈ {0, 1} 8 . Then, the number of the remaining candidate key is 2 0 on average in each key group. We exhaustively check the remaining 2 96 candidate keys until the correct key is found.
B. COMPLEXITIES OF FOUR-ROUND UNBALANCED BICLIQUE CRYPTANALYSIS ON GIFT-128 1) DATA COMPLEXITY
In Figure 4 (right), for each unbalanced biclique structure, we decrypt S 0 with the keys K [0,j] to obtain P j . All the plaintexts do not have differences only in 12 cells(S31, S30, S29, S28, S26, S24, S23, S22, S21, S20, S18 and S16). However, there are differences in the remaining 20 cells. Thus, the data complexity does not exceed 2 80 .
2) COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
The computation complexity of the attack depends mainly on the number of the SubCell. Each round of GIFT-128 is composed of 16 SubCells and single encryption includes 40 × 32 = 1280 SubCells. For each key of the 2 96 groups, the specific computation is as follows.
3) BICLIQUE COMPLEXITY
In Figure 4 (left), 16 SubCells (noted with blue) are calculated 2 4 times, 8 SubCells (noted with diagonal stripes) are calculated 2 2 times, and 8 SubCells (noted with vertical stripes) are calculated 2 1 times. In Figure 4( 
4) MATCHING COMPLEXITY
In the forward direction( Figure 5 , left) of a single S i , 8 Sub-Cells (noted with red) need to compute 2 4 times, and 2 Sub-Cells (noted with diagonal crosshatch) need to compute 2 3 times. 46 SubCells (noted with diagonal stripes) need to compute 2 2 times, and 8 SubCells (noted with vertical stripes) need to compute 2 1 times. 72 SubCells (noted with yellow) are computed only once, and 24 SubCells (noted with white) must not be computed. Thus, the complexity of this process is 2 24 × (2 4 × 8 + 2 3 × 2 + 2 2 × 46 + 2 1 × 8 + 72) SubCells, which is approximately 2 22 .38 full round GIFT-128 encryptions.
In the backward direction( Figure 5 , right) of a single C j , 872 SubCells (noted with blue) need to compute 2 4 times, and 20 SubCells (noted with diagonal crosshatch) need to compute 2 3 times. 28 SubCells (noted with diagonal stripes) need to compute 2 2 times, and 8 SubCells (noted with vertical stripes) need to compute 2 1 times. 24 SubCells (noted with yellow) are computed only once, and 40 SubCells (noted with white) must not be computed. Thus, the complexity of this process is 2 8 × (2 4 × 872 + 2 3 × 20 + 2 2 × 28 + 2 1 × 8 + 24) SubCells, which is approximately 2 11 .48 full round GIFT-128 encryptions.
Finally, 2 32 key candidates are verified by a matching variable(32-bit) in each group, and the average of 2 32−32 = 1 candidate key should be rechecked.
Thus, the total computational complexity of the four-round unbalanced biclique attack on GIFT-128 is: C ≈ 2 96 × (2 −1.36 + 2 22.38 + 2 11.48 + 2 0 ) ≈ 2 118.38 (5)
5) MEMORY COMPLEXITY
We need to store 2 4 × 16 bits (the backward direction) for the attack.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel method for the attack of a full-round GIFT block cipher. Additionally, we describe the construction of a biclique structure and the analysis of the cipher. We present a full-round biclique cryptanalysis of GIFT by investigating the simple key schedule and encryption structure.
Then, we construct a five-round 4×16 unbalanced biclique on GIFT-64, with data complexities of 2 16 and computational complexities of 2 122.95 , respectively. Moreover, we use a fourround 8×24 unbalanced biclique on GIFT-128 with data complexities of 2 80 and computational complexities of 2 118.38 , respectively.
These results are superior to the currently known results,thereby indicating that the biclique attack can easily attack certain ciphers with slow diffusion and simple key schedule. Thus, the designers of lightweight ciphers must improve the implementation efficiency, key schedule complexity and diffusion speed thereof.
